Abstract Probabilistic Packet Marking algorithm suggests a methodology to identify all the participated routers of the attack path by probabilistically marking the packets. In this approach, these marked packets contain partial information regarding the routers of the attack path. At receiver, to get the complete information of every router, it requires more number of marked packets and hence more combinations and more false positives. To overcome this drawback we have presented a novel idea in finding the exact IP address of the routers in the attack path by applying Chinese Remainder Theorem. The result of our implementation reveals that our idea requires less number of marked packets and takes no time in constructing the attack path. The same idea is true even in the case of multiple attackers. 
Introduction
Information transfer became very easy due to the invention of Internet. The speed of transmission has been tremendously increased and along with this, the attack rate has also grown exponentially. An ''attack'' is defined as a method of creating obstruction during the transmission of information. Due to the attacks all authorized persons are unable to retrieve the information while unauthorized people are successful in getting the information.
These attacks are broadly categorized as passive and active attacks. Generally passive attacks are difficult to detect but to some extent easy to prevent. Active attacks are difficult to prevent and simple to detect. In the active attacks, one of the most upsetting and very difficult task is to trace the adversary, called DOS attack, in which the legitimate people are unable to access the information. This is due to the intense logging of redundant packets sent by the attacker. This problem can be solved by finding the IP address of the attacker, but the IP address can be spoofed. Hence the best solution in dealing with DOS attacks is to find the attack path from the victim to the adversary [10] [11] [12] [13] . The process of constructing the attack path using the information from the received packets is called IP Traceback.
Different techniques have been proposed for IP Traceback [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] but they all have short comings, such as limit on their usability in practice. Probabilistic Packet Marking algorithm (PPM) was originally suggested by Burch and Cheswick [1] and later it was designed and implemented by Savage et al. [2] to solve the IP Traceback problem. This PPM algorithm has two procedures one packet marking procedure and second graph reconstruction procedure. In the packet marking procedure, when a router receives a packet, a random number is generated and the packets will be marked by comparing it with the threshold value P m which is a predefined value. At the victim, graph reconstruction procedure uses these marked packets to construct the graph [9] . This approach called as fragment marking scheme (FMS), and it has a very high computation overhead at the victim to construct the attack path and when an attack originates from multiple sources then the false combination rate is high(false positives) which is a major drawback of this algorithm.
Song and Perrig [3] elucidated an Advanced Marking Scheme (AMS) to rectify the problem of IP Traceback. This technique uses the hash value of IP address to encode the packets rather than the IP address itself. Similar to FMS this has low network and router overhead. This AMS also has lower false positive rate and lower computation overhead at the victim. The major drawback of this algorithm is the victim can construct the attack path only when he has the map of the upstream routers.
Dean et al. [4] proposed an Algebraic Traceback Approach (ATA) which encodes router's IP address as a polynomial in Identification field of IPv4 packet. However this algorithm does not scale in large number of DDoS attacks. Source Path Isolation Engine (SPIE) was explicated by Snoren et al. [5] . This could perform Traceback using just a single packet, however it requires large amount of storage space and hardware changes for packet logging due to which it is not practically deployable.
Kiremire et al. [14] made a comparative study of different PPM algorithms [2] [3] [4] [5] in various network topologies. Kiremire et al. [15] explained that three network-dependent factors affect different PPM-based schemes uniquely giving rise to a variation and discrepancy between scheme performances from one network to another.
Lih-Chyau et al. [7] explained an IP Traceback process based on Chinese Remainder Theorem. In this paper the IP address of the routers and remainder values, calculated using Chinese Remainder Theorem, is sent through the marked packets. These packets are used to construct the attack path. When compared to the previous procedures false positive rate has been reduced to some extent but still have more combinations and hence false positives.
In our present paper, we have proposed a novel idea of finding the IP addresses of the attack path, by drastically reducing the comparisons and also false positives, by applying Chinese Remainder Theorem on every IP address. The success rate of finding the IP addresses of attack path is 96.484375 and rate of false positives has been significantly reduced to 3.515625. Our paper is organized as follows. We have explained our proposed procedure for IP Header encoding using CRT in Section 2 and the corresponding Probabilistic Packet Marking algorithm using CRT is presented in Section 3. Method for constructing attack path is elucidated in Section 4. Results are shown in Section 5 and the paper is concluded in Section 6.
IP Header encoding using CRT
The DOS attacks can be solved by constructing the attack path there by finding the source router of the attacker. IP Traceback is a technique to find the IP addresses of the routers in the attack path. In this section we explain the technique of IP Traceback by applying Chinese Remainder Theorem.
Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) states that
where m 1 , m 2 , m 3 , . . ., m k are pair wise relatively prime. Then the system of congruences X " a i mod m i where 1 6 i 6 k has a unique solution modulo M. According to our proposed methodology at each router, a unique X value is calculated using CRT for its IP address. The corresponding X values of every router are sent to the receiver by placing the X value in the Identification field of IPv4 packet header. At the receiver, by applying modular inverse on X, the IP address of every router can be deduced. As the value of X is unique, the occurrences of fallacy IP addresses are drastically reduced.
The main aim of the DOS attack is to find the IP addresses of the routers through which the packets are traversed. The address of each router cannot be encoded as a whole due to the limitation of packet header size. The IP packet header format is shown in Fig 1. The 16 bit Identification field of IPv4 is used to store the IP address. As the address of each router is of 32 bits, it cannot be fitted into the identification field as a whole. This forced us to fragment the IP address into 4 equal parts each of 8 bits.
The IP address is split at each dot, into four parts denoted as IP 1 Then, X value can be calculated in the following manner
As M = 251 · 253 · 255 · 256, will cover all the IP addresses belonging to class A, B, C and D.
Due to the IP packet header constraint, a user can send utmost 16 bits in the Identification field apart from the remaining header bits. For example for the IP address 192.168.0.1, IP 1 = 192, IP 2 = 168, IP 3 = 0, IP 4 = 1. The X value is calculated as 954262785 by applying Eq. (3) on the above four parts of the IP address. The binary format, corresponding to this X value is 00111000111000001110010100000001 where X 0 = 00111000, X 1 = 11100000, X 2 = 11100101 and X 3 = 00000001. In order to properly combine all the parts of every X value corresponding to each IP address at the receiver, we are concatenating two successive parts (X 0 X 1 , X 1 X 2 , X 2 X 3 , X 3 X 0 ) and each part is placed into the identification field of IPv4 as shown in Fig. 2 . For the above example the four fragments are shown in Fig. 3 . Each fragment placed in the Identification field, is sent to the receiver. The fragment number is placed in the type of service (TOS) field, and the number of hops from the router to the victim (distance), in the time to live (TTL) field. The TTL field is initially set to twice the number of hops (from routing table) from the marking router to the victim (see Fig. 4 ).
Modified Probabilistic Packet Marking algorithm using CRT
In the PPM algorithm, every IP address is divided into 8 fragments and these fragments are sent through 8 packets. At the receiver, by combining these fragments, a very large number of combinations occur and hence more false positives. This drawback is addressed in our paper by dividing the IP address into four fragments only and applying CRT on these fragments to generate a unique X value, ensuring to reduce the number of combinations and false positives.
The PPM algorithm has been modified so that already marked packet if selected for marking, is not marked again by introducing a flag field. The MPPM procedure is explained below. When a packet arrives at a router, it generates a ran- Figure 6 Marked information of fragment number, fragment and distance.
dom number ''rand''. If rand is less than the threshold marking probability P m and if flag field is equal to 0, then the packet is marked. This is done by setting the TOS field with the fragment number, identification field with the fragment (any two successive parts of X value), TTL field with distance and finally flag to 1 indicating that it has been marked [8] . When the same packet is selected to mark by the subsequent router, as the flag is set to 1, only the distance field is decremented keeping the remaining fields unaltered. When a flag field is 1 the packet cannot be marked again even though the threshold value is satisfied.
Marking procedure at router R
Fragno ‹ 0 For (each packet pkt received from router R) { Generate a random number rand between [0. . .1) If (rand < P m and flag = 0) then
The reconstruction procedure of IP addresses of routers in the attack path is explained below. When the receiver receives the marked packets, the following information is extracted from every packet header. Fragment from Identification field, fragment number from TOS field and distance from TTL field are extracted. The above information is placed in a table called Restable. At the receiver there is every possibility of getting the same fragments encoded into the multiple marked packets. This duplicate information has been eliminated in order to reduce the number of comparisons and hence false positives. Let S d be the set of routers away from the victim at distance d. The stored information from the Restable is ordered by the fragment number and distance d then the successive fragments are compared.
For example, a fragment 0 which is a combination of X 1 X 2 of part of X value, which represents a part of IP address at distance d is compared against fragment 1, which is a combination of X 2 X 3 of the same X value, representing another part of same IP address at distance d. The least significant 8 bits (LS8 bits) of fragment 0 i.e., part X 2 is compared with the Most Significant 8 bits (MS8 bits) of fragment 1. If this comparison is true then we get first 16 bits of X. Similarly X 3 (LS8 bits) of fragment 1 is compared with X 3 (MS8 bits) of fragment 2. If this comparison is true, we get another successive 8 bits of X and hence total 24 bits are received. Next, X 4 (LS8 bits) of fragment 2 is compared with X 4 (MS8 bits) of fragment 3. If the above comparison is true, we get the last 8 Figure 7 Marked information after the duplicates are removed and ordered. bits of X the total bits received are 32 bits. Finally X 0 (LS8 bits) of fragment 3 is compared with X 0 (MS8 bits) of fragment 0 to further enhance the verification process. This ensures that right parts of X value are properly appended to get correct X value. From the above step, receiver successfully gets all the 32 bits of a unique X value.
From the X value applying Chinese Remainder Theorem, all the four parts of IP address can be derived as follows.
The above parts will be combined properly in the consecutive order and hence IP address can be achieved. Similarly by combining the fragments properly, from all the received marked packets, X values can be calculated and thus different IP addresses of the attack path can be deduced. In the absence of the network topology, multiple attack paths can be extorted using real (exact) IP addresses only without any false positives.
Reconstruction procedure at victim v
Let Restable be a table of tuples(fragno, fragment, distance) for each packet pkt from attacker 
Results
In this experimentation, we have considered a linear network with three routers R1, R2 and R3 as shown in Fig. 5 Table 1 .
This X value is divided into 4 parts, and each fragment (two successive parts) along with the fragment number and distance are sent through a packet. At the receiver, the information from the TOS, Identification and the Time To Live (TTL) fields corresponding to fragment number, fragment and the distance field respectively, are extracted from IPv4 packet header and is shown in Fig. 6 . Fig. 7 depicts the above information after removal of duplicates. By juxtaposing all the successive fragments with the same distance field, results in 40 bits of X value are as shown in Fig. 8 . For further verification of the proper combination of the four parts of X value, the most significant 8 bits and the least significant 8 bits of the X value are compared and if they are equal, that X value is considered. By applying the modular inverse on these X values (first 32 bits) generate the exact IP addresses of all the routers in the attack path without any false positives as shown in Fig. 8 .
Conclusion
The main aim of IP Traceback technique is to acquire the IP addresses of the router in the attack path exactly and to construct the attack path back to locate the source router of the attacker. As it is not possible to send the IP address in a single packet, we are forced to send the IP address in fragments. The Savage et al. in their work divided each IP address into 8 fragments and the Lin-Chyau et al. divided each IP address into 5 fragments. At the receiver when there are more fragments for every IP address there will be more combinations and hence more false positives.
This drawback made us to reduce the fragments. In our proposal we divided the IP address into four fragments only and applied Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) on each IP address of the attack path. Due to the application of CRT we are successful in obtaining the exact IP addresses of the attack path with 96.484375 as success rate. The 100% success rate could not be achieved due to the following. We conclude our paper that exact IP address in the attack path can be traced out with 96.484375 success rate. If the victim knows the network topology, then he can construct the attack path in no time. This is also applicable even in the case of multiple attackers. Our theme can be further extended to construct the attack path in the absence of information regarding network topology. 
